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THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE IN BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION-CLASSICAL ABSTENTION
The abstention doctrine represents one attempt by the federal
courts to deal with the pressures and conflicts of parallel federal and
state court systems. In the landmark case of Railroad Commission v.
Pullman Co.,1 the Supreme Court acknowledged the doctrine as part
of the body of federal jurisprudence and established the conceptual
framework within which the doctrine has developed. The Court unani-
mously reversed the decree of a three-judge district court 2 granting an
injunction against enforcement of an order of the Railroad Commission
of Texas, and remanded the case with directions to retain the bill pend-
ing a determination of proceedings to be brought in the state courts.
Thus, a federal court confronted with a case in which its jurisdiction
was properly laid, and which also contained sensitive federal concerns,'
was directed not to exercise its jurisdiction-the outstanding char-
acteristic of abstention.
In the Pullman opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter articulated three
basic concerns which have been regarded as the "classical" theoretical
construct for discussion and development of a doctrine which requires
a federal court to abstain from an action which it would otherwise
normally take. The first and perhaps the most consistently applied
rationale is the settled policy of federal courts to avoid an unnecessary
decision of a constitutional question.' Thus, in a case in which a
constitutional issue is raised, but where state law is unsettled or unclear,
a federal court, by use of its power to abstain, can stay further pro-
ceedings in the case before it until the state law questions are resolved
1312 U.S. 496 (1941).
2 Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Tex. 1940).
3 The Commission had issued an order prohibiting the operation of any sleeping
car on any line of railroad in Texas unless a Pullman conductor was in charge.
Ordinarily, one Pullman conductor, a white employee, supervised the Pullman porters,
Negro employees, who were each in turn responsible for one Pullman car. Previ-
ously, when a train carried only a single Pullman car, only the Pullman porter was
necessary. The Commission's order prompted action by the Pullman Company and
several Texas railroads in the federal district court to enjoin enforcement. In addi-
tion to the Pullman porters' charge of discrimination in violation of the fourteenth
amendment, the complaints alleged violation of the equal protection, due process and
commerce clauses of the Constitution. The complaints also charged that the order
was in excess of the Commission's authority under the Texas statute.
4 See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-75 (1947), and cases
cited therein for a discussion of this principle, its application to various situations
and the general considerations of policy and administration that support it.
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in an appropriate state forum.5 The state determination may render the
constitutional decision moot."
It is imperative to notice that cases presenting facts justifying
application of the first abstention rationale (avoiding an unnecessary
constitutional decision), if they contain the requisite amount in contro-
versy, satisfy by definition the requirements for "federal question"
jurisdiction.7 It is reasonable to suppose that the nearly invariable
ordering of abstention on such a finding 8 is a function of the coincidence
of the concerns which prompted development of constitutional absten-
tion and the purposes for which federal question jurisdiction was con-
ferred. Abstention where determination of a constitutional question
necessarily depends upon unclear state law is avowedly to avoid an
incorrect forecast of state law and therefore an irrelevant or premature
resolution of the constitutional issue. Such a concern complements
the desire to prevent a multiplicity of interpretations of the Constitution
by various state courts with a resulting lack of certainty and uniformity
in the federal law.' ° Absent some compelling reason to retain juris-
diction, a finding of facts raising the possibility of constitutional
abstention narrowly circumscribes the discretion permitted the district
court."
5 The technique of staying the federal proceedings has frequently been em-
ployed in such Constitutional abstention situations. An excellent general discussion
of the dispositive alternatives used by federal courts when abstaining may be found
in Note, Judicial Abstention from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COLUm.
L. Rxv. 749, 771-76 (1959).
6 An excellent example of the operation of this approach is found in Spector
Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). The plaintiff, Spector, was
engaged in the interstate trucking business exclusively and maintained two leased
terminals in Connecticut for that purpose. It sued in federal district court for in-
junctive relief from a corporation tax imposed by the state of Connecticut, alleging
inter alia violation of both the commerce and due process clauses of the United States
Constitution. The district court concluded that the tax was not applicable to the
plaintiff, 47 F. Supp. 671 (D. Conn. 1942). On appeal, the Second Circuit determined
that it was necessary to reach the federal constitutional questions and sustained the
tax, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1943). The Supreme Court held that construction of the
tax by the courts of Connecticut must precede the determination of the constitutional
issue in view of the fact that the statute was unconstrued and susceptible to a number
of legitimate interpretations which might affect or moot the constitutional decision.
728 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964) :
(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclu-
sive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.
8 Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TExAs L. REv. 815, 816-17
(1959).
9 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 104 (1944); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
1o Mishkin, The Federal "Questioiz" in the District Courts, 53 COLUtm. L. REv.
157, 157-59 (1953); see 1 F. MooRE, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 2.228, at
424 (3d rev. ed. 1966).
11 It is nonetheless quite clear that the district court may not mechanically yield
to a state court determination, even in the constitutional abstention area. See NAACP
v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1958) (per curiam) :
When the validity of a state statute, challenged under the United States
Constitution, is properly for adjudication before a United States District
19681
944 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The second ground which prompted abstention was the desire to
avoid undue conflict with state administration and regulation., Cog-
nizant of the disruptive effect a federal injunction directed against
state officials might have on orderly state administration, the courts
have made effective use of abstention. 3 However, these concerns of
"comity" which dictate abstention, unlike the concerns in constitutional
abstention situations, are not clearly identical with the reasons which
prompted the conferral of jurisdiction on the federal district court.
Frequently, cases involving comity abstention are entitled to a federal
forum because of diversity jurisdiction,14 which was conferred in
Court, reference to the state courts for construction of the statute should not
automatically be made. The judgment is vacated and the case remanded
• . . for consideration in light of Harrison v. NAACP [360 U.S. 167
(1959)].
See Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485, 487 (1956). The reference to Harrison is some-
what puzzling because, although that case, like Bennett, was a civil rights case, the
Supreme Court in Harrison remanded with instructions to abstain, where the district
court had construed newly-enacted state legislation as unconstitutional. Bennett and
Harrison have been read to define a limited discretion allowable to the district court
in a constitutional abstention situation. Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism,
108 U. PA. L. Rxv. 226, 236-37 (1959).
The dissent in Harrison, which is reasserted in Bennett, makes it clear that the
district court should consider the vulnerability of protected civil rights in state court
proceedings. It is important, however, to note that the court in Harrison considers
that case, with jurisdiction based on the Civil Rights Statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983 (1964), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964), no differently than if it were based on diversity
or federal question jurisdiction. Note, Judicial Abstention from the Exercise of
Federal Jurisdiction, 59 Coitus. L. Rxv. 749, 768 (1959). Thus, insofar as the
district court may properly be regarded as allowed to consider civil rights concerns
in its discretion, the same discretion should be available when diversity or comity
interest are present in a constitutional abstention situation.
12Various commentators have attributed this concern in part to the expansive
rule pronounced by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
which made possible the broad use of federal injunctive power against state officials
acting in their official capacities. Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism,
108 U. PA. L. Rswv. 226, 226-27 (1959) ; Note. Jvdicial Abstention from the Exercise
of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 CoLhm. L. REv. 749, 749-52 (1959).
1 3 An example of this approach is Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933). In
Hawks, an injunction was sought by the owners of a toll bridge in Oklahoma to
prevent state officials from obstructing the collection of tolls in accordance with a
directive by the state highway commissioner that the bridge had become a part of
the "free" highway system. The district court granted a motion to dismiss the suit,
50 F.2d 628 (W.D. Okla. 1931), and the court of appeals reversed, 58 F.2d 41 (10th
Cir. 1932). The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and held dismissal proper.
In an opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Cardozo explained the reason for dismissal
in the following terms:
Only a case of manifest oppression will justify a federal court in laying
such a check [injunction] upon administrative officers acting colore officii in
a conscientious endeavor to fulfill their duty to the state. A prudent self-
restraint is called for at such times if state and national functions are to be
maintained in stable equilibrium.
288 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added). Other early examples are Spielman Motor Sales
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935), and Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176
(1935), discussed at notes 92-93 infra and accompanying text.
Dismissal is most appropriate where the rationale for abstention is non-interference
with state administration, as in Hawks, but it may be used in other situations. See,
e.g., Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929).
14 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thilbodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959),
discussed at notes 35-41 infra and accompanying text; Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
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response to the fear that local courts and juries might be prejudiced
against out-of-state parties or claims." Thus, federal jurisdiction
based on diversity insulates against local or state interests which may
or may not be the very interests that comity abstention protects.
Where state comity concerns arise in a diversity case, the decision
whether to abstain can meaningfully be made only by the district court
as a proper exercise of its equitable powers and in light of all the
circumstances of the case before it. The potential prejudice to the
state interests may be enormous or minimal, ranging, for example,
from a challenge to an important state-wide regulatory scheme to a
protest over the price offered in condemnation of a small parcel of
property sought for a relatively insignificant township use. Similarly,
although today there is seldom hostility against the citizens of one state
in the courts of a sister state, the problem has not ceased to exist, and
the concerns which prompted diversity jurisdiction are of frequent
importance in such areas as civil rights. 6
Finally, despite the clear power of a federal court to determine
questions of state law necessary to the decision of a case before it,"
abstention has been thought appropriate on the authority of the third
articulated Pullman concern-where the applicable state law was
uncertain, highly complex or without a clear construction by an
authoritative tribunal.' 8  Thus the wise exercise of discretion might
allow a court, despite the absence of a constitutional claim or issue, to
defer the determination of state law to the state court. This approach
was apparently indicated by the Court, even prior to Pullman, in
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.'9 The Supreme Court in
(1943) ; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933), discussed at note 13 supra. Diversity
jurisdiction is granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964) :
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens
or subjects thereof are additional parties.
15 Phillips & Christenson, The Historical and Legal Background of the Diversity
Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 959 (1960); see W. BARRON & A. HOLTzOv , FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PRocEDuRE § 26, at 131 n.76.6 (Rules ed. 1960).
16See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179-84 (1959).
17 See Comment, Stare Decisis and the Lower Courts: Two Recent Cases, 59
COLUM. L. REv. 504, 512 (1959), and cases cited.
18 This justification has been, according to some authorities, a result of pressures
arising from Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Clark, Federal Pro-
cedural Reformn and States' Rights; to a More Perfect Union, 40 TEXAs L. R-v.
211, 218-29 (1961) ; Note, Louisiana Power & Light v. Thibodaux: The Abstention
Doctrine Expanded, 69 YAL L.J. 643, 648 (1960).
19 309 U.S. 478 (1940). In Thompson, a railroad was undergoing reorganization
within §77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §205 (1964), when oil, the title to
which was in dispute, was discovered under its right of way. The trustee petitioned
the reorganization court for an adjudication of title. The district court found it had
jurisdiction of the question, granted an injunction against further assertion of rights
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Thompson found that the district court had jurisdiction, based on the
bankruptcy laws,"° of a title controversy which presented no consti-
tutional or state comity problems, but further found that the complex
questions of state law should nevertheless be determined in the state
courts, and instructed the district court to order the trustee to proceed
in state court for adjudication of title.
Notwithstanding Thompson, it is not clear whether abstention
based only on the third rationale is presently permissible. In 1943,
the Supreme Court elaborated upon its Thompson and Pullman de-
cisions in Meredith v. Winter Haven,"' a case based on diversity juris-
diction. The Court held that difficulty in finding state law did not
automatically preclude a federal decision, but that the federal courts
might exercise properly laid jurisdiction unless some "defined prin-
ciple" or consideration of "recognized public policy" suggested other-
wise. '  The Court then engaged in a discourse on the policy con-
siderations that would indicate when abstention is appropriate:
[A] federal court, adhering to the salutary principle of re-
fraining from the unnecessary decision of constitutional ques-
tions, may stay proceedings before it, to enable the parties to
litigate first in the state courts questions of state law, decision
of which is preliminary to, and may render unnecessary,
decision of the constitutional questions presented.3
Abstention, in a case where an unnecessary constitutional decision
could be avoided, was thus endorsed, as was abstention which would
prevent interference with state administration.' Nonetheless, the
Court, while indicating an awareness of Thompson, made no effort to
distinguish it from the case before it; 25 it concluded that the court of
appeals could not reverse the discretionary decision of the district court
not to abstain where the record showed only unclear state law, the
third Pullman ground.
in the property by other parties and reserved the question of actual title, 309 U.S.
at 480-81. The court of appeals dissolved the injunction and determined by its own
construction of the state's property law that the reorganization court was without
jurisdiction in the controversy. 106 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1939).
2oSee notes 50-51 infra and accompanying text.
21320 U.S. 228 (1943).
22 320 U.S. at 234.
City officials were going to call in bonds in a manner which the plaintiffs thought
illegal. Suit was brought by the plaintiffs in federal court (based on diversity juris-
diction) for injunction against this call. The Florida law regarding the bonds was
unclear, but the district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court
of appeals ordered abstention. 134 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1943).
23320 U.S. at 236 (citing Pullman).
24 Id. at 235-36.
2 5 Id. at 236. The case is cited following the quotation reproduced in the text
accompanying note 23 supra (abstention to avoid an unnecessary constitutional de-
cision). It is introduced, however, by a cf. signal, and close analysis of Thompson
reveals that no problem or claim of constitutional right was involved. See note 19
sipra and accompanying text.
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[T]he difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may
hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves
afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to
exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case .... 26
The Court only belatedly resolved this apparent conflict 27 and no
small amount of confusion has resulted.s The probable interpretation
is that the Court considered the fact that the Thompson case was a
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act a sufficient distinction. At the
time of the Thompson decision, the Court had already indicated that
abstention was proper in the discretion of a bankruptcy court where no
constitutional or state comity problems existed;' 9 shortly after
Thompson it again upheld a decision by a bankruptcy court to abstain
solely because of unclear state law."0
2 8Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
27 Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 489-90 (1949). Discussing abstention, the
Court stated:
This suggested procedure has been followed . . . where the only issue
in the case was one of state law, although federal jurisdiction was based on
the Bankruptcy Act [citing Thompson]. We have refused in a diversity of
citizenship case to allow the difficulty of an issue of state law to deter us
from exercising our jurisdiction when federal determination was subject to
equitable discretion and the state issue was the only one in the case [citing
Meredith].
28 An example of this followed shortly after the Court's apparent about-face in
Meredith. The federal court for the district of New Jersey, faced with the long and
complex reorganization of the New Jersey Central Railroad, In re Central R. Co.,
152 F.2d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 1945), affd in part and rev'd in part mb nom., Gardner
v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565 (1947), was petitioned by the state of New Jersey and
its attorney general to stay proceedings before a master and to grant permission
for suit to be brought in the state courts to determine a number of highly complicated
questions of state law, including the railroads' challenges of the constitutionality of
state legislation. The motion was denied, In re Central R. Co., 163 F.2d 44, 45
(1947), and the Third Circuit on appeal felt compelled to order abstention to allow
the state court proceedings. In re Central R. Co., 163 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 810 (1947).
The Third Circuit opinion attempted to deal with the Thompson-Meredith
dilemma by distinguishing Thompson as a case where the court "request[ed] state
scrutiny of the facts at bar" in view of a "lack of relevant . . . law." 163 F.2d at 48.
This was hardly the situation. See discussion of Thompson at notes 19-20 supra and
accompanying text. The Thompson court summarizes its opinion by stating that
there is a problem of finding which law is applicable and by citing the opposite results
reached by two different courts to show the possibility of that determination being
made either way and the consequent need for submitting the question to the state
court. 309 U.S. 478, 484 (1940). Meredith is cited with approval by the Third
Circuit as a statement of general position. 163 F.2d at 48. The opinion then engages
in a recitation of the complexities of the case and finally concludes unconvincingly:
We have not here . . . a question of which of two courts might better decide an
issue. We have rather a question which only one court can effectively decide." Id.
at 53. Cf. cases discussed at note 98 infra.
29 Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77 (1936), discussed at notes 100-19
infra and accompanying text.
30 Mangus v. Miller, 317 U.S. 178 (1942). The opinion gives some indication
that the fact of bankruptcy jurisdiction was to be considered in the abstention decision:
Indeed, before dismissing the proceedings because of difficulties in ascertaining
the rights of the debtor under state law and in administering them in bank-
ruptcy, it would be an appropriate exercise of the court's jurisdiction to take
1968]
948 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The synthesis thus seems to be that abstention based solely on
unclear state law questions presented to a federal court is improper,
but, in proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, both substantive and
procedural concerns are sufficiently unique that abstention is allowable
even on this ground in the sound discretion of the district court sitting
in bankruptcy or reorganization.-"
Supreme Court decisions following Meredith continued, until 1959,
to be more or less consistently based on one or both of the two rationales
approved by the Court-constitutional abstention 82 and comity ab-
stention.3 "Classical" state-law abstention has continued to be held im-
proper where it was the sole basis for refusal to exercise jurisdiction. 4
In 1959, the Supreme Court reexamined the abstention doctrine.
In two highly controversial decisions, County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co.,"5 and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux,"8
the Court departed from the settled scope of doctrinal application."'
The cases are factually quite difficult to reconcile and prompted a
wealth of comment.as The thrust of the change, however, seems to
suitable measures to remove those difficulties by affording the interested
parties opportunity to assert their rights in the state courts ....
Id. at 185 (emphasis added). This case arose under the § 75 provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act for agricultural compositions and extensions. Act of July 1, 1898,
ch. 541, § 75, 30 Stat. 544, added by, ch. 204, § 1, 47 Stat. 1470 (1933). The right
of farmers to file petitions under § 75(a) - (r) expired on March 1, 1949. Techni-
cally, §75(s), 11 U.S.C. §203(s) (1964), is still in force, but it operates only on
a case filed under §75(a)-(r). Section 75 is now therefore of largely historical
interest.
31 Judge Friendly recognized this analysis in First Nat'l Bank v. Reed, 306 F.2d
481 (2d Cir. 1962), another bankruptcy case in which unclear state law moved the
court to order abstention with the following statement:
Moreover, the issue does not here arise in a diversity action, see Mere-
dith . . . where "abstention" . . . [took] the extreme form of dismissal
Here Federal jurisdiction rests on bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy
Act contains several provisions looking toward state court determination of
issues arising in the administration of bankrupt estates.
Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
32See, e.g., Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); Spector Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). A detailed analysis of the consistency of
case law during this period may be found in Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Fed-
eralism, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 229-33 (1959).
3 3 See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
3 4 See, e.g., Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S.
472 (1949).
M360 U.S. 185 (1959).
86 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
37 Three other abstention decisions handed down at the same time appear to fall
within the older limits: Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (state court
construction of state statute should precede constitutional determination); Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (same); Martin v.
Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959) (deference to state administrative appeal system).
8 See, e.g., Note, Louisiana Power & Light v. Thibodaux: The Abstention by
Doctrine Expanded, 69 YALE L.J. 643 (1960) ; Note, Consequences of Abstention by
a Federal Court, 73 HARv. L. Rwv. 1358 (1960) ; Note, Abstention: An Exercise in
Federalismn, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959); Note, Judicial Abstention from the
Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 CoLum. L. Rv. 749 (1959).
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be an expansion of the application of the doctrine.3 9 Some authorities
also foresaw a relaxation of the Meredith rule that state-law abstention
is inappropriate where it is the sole ground." Most important, how-
ever, is the affirmation of district court discretion to weigh the prob-
lems of state comity and diversity jurisdiction.
41
Since there has been no major change in classical abstention since
Thibodaux and Mashuda, a federal district court (at least in situations
where there exist no interests of comity or possibility of avoiding
an unnecessary constitutional decision by a prior state determination
of unclear law) now confidently may use its discretion in determining
whether or not to abstain. And, although the allowable limits of
discretion are not fixed,' at least the district court must not refuse to
consider the jurisdictional bases of the case before it in making that
decision 4 3  Moreover, at least in case of a dispute in which juris-
diction rests on the Bankruptcy Act, the district court may yield its
jurisdiction in a greater number of circumstances than when jurisdiction
rests on diversity or a federal question.
THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT
Essential to an understanding of the application of abstention to
bankruptcy cases is a consideration of the distinctive provisions of
39 The prior notion that abstention was only an equitable device was negatived
by its application to situations at law. Abstention, by stay of the federal action, was
upheld in the eminent domain proceedings of Thibodaux where state law was un-
settled, but not in similar proceedings in Mashuda where the law appeared clear.
The conclusion that this application beyond equity was proper in some cases is
strengthened by the Court's decision a year later in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
363 U.S. 207 (1960), where constitutional abstention was ordered in a common law
action against an insurance company.
Similar decisions tending to expand the application of the doctrine beyond the
scope of application indicated by the Court in Mashuda and Thibodaux include P.
Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951) (stay of trademark infringe-
ment action where crowded federal docket and prior state action), and Mottolese v.
Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949) (stay of shareholder action pending state
suit consolidating nine similar actions). Such an expansion has been given some
support and is discussed in Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism:
The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 490-92 (1960).
40 C. VRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, § 52, at 175 (1963); Note, Abstention: An
Exercise in Federalinm, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 247-48 (1959). However, McNeese
v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), claims to reaffirm the Court's Meredith
approach, despite Thibodaux, although the Court said "no underlying issue of state
law [was] controlling in this litigation." Id. at 674.
41 All the opinions in both Mashuda and Thibodaux view defining the parameters
of district court discretion as the issue. See 360 U.S. at 27, 28, 31, 36, 188, 199.
Various commentators have been persuaded that the opinions indicate Supreme Court
approval of district court discretion. Note, Louisianz Power & Light v. Thibodaux:
The Abstention Doctrine Expanded, 69 YALE L.J. 643, 654-55 (1960); Note, Ab-
stention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 236-37, 248 (1959).
42 Compare the narrow grant of discretion in constitutional abstention cases, dis-
cussed at note 11 supra and accompanying text, with the district court's broader dis-
cretion in comity situations, discussed at text accompanying note 16 supra.
43 This is the effect of the Bennett and Harrison decisions, discussed at note 11
supra.
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bankruptcy jurisdiction and procedure which bear directly on the
bankruptcy court's decision to abstain. The Constitution of the
United States gives Congress the power "to establish . . . uniform
Laws on the Subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." I
Pursuant to this grant, Congress has exercised continuous authority
over bankruptcies since the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,' 5
the statute which forms the nucleus of modern American bankruptcy
law. This federal power is exclusive, and was characterized thusly by
the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus:
The power of Congress to establish uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States is
unrestricted and paramount . . . . The national purpose
to establish uniformity necessarily excludes state regulation. 46
Despite its supremacy, however, the Bankruptcy Act does not encom-
pass all questions relating to bankruptcy,47 and state regulation of
potentially conflicting areas has been sanctioned."
As a necessary part of the exercise of this power, the Bankruptcy
Act invests the federal district courts in the various states (and certain
other federal courts) " with original jurisdiction in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, as well as in certain other related controversies." The juris-
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
4530 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1964). There were
three earlier attempts by Congress to establish a federal bankruptcy act (1800, 1841,
and 1867), but in each instance the statute was repealed in a relatively short time.
1 H. REmiNGTON, BANKRUPTCY §§ 7-9 (5th ed. 1950). During the periods without
federal bankruptcy legislation, the states properly exercised sole authority over debtors
and their relief. Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
46278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
47 Thus a state insolvency statute may remain in effect in so far as it is not
superseded by the federal bankruptcy legislation. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,
278 U.S. 261 (1929); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
48 Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918). Moreover, Congress constitutionally
may provide within the Bankruptcy Act itself for state exemption statutes to be con-
tinued in effect regarding the estate of a bankrupt, thus allowing priorities of payment
and such institutions as dower, despite the variance from state to state. Hanover
Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1902). As a result, there is not in-
frequent difficulty in determining whether state legislation, as sought to be enforced,
conflicts with federal bankruptcy administration. Indeed, the limitations of the fed-
eral bankruptcy power have never been precisely defined. See, e.g., Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 669-71 (1935)
(upholding the reorganization sections as a valid exercise of the federal bankruptcy
power against objections that the clauses providing for protection and rehabilitation of
the debtor exceeded the constitutional grant).
49 "'[C]ourts of bankruptcy' shall include the United States district courts and
the district courts of the Territories and possessions to which this Act is or may here-
after be applicable." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 1(10), 11 U.S.C. § 1(10) (1964).
50 § 11. Creation of Courts of Bankruptcy and Their Jurisdiction. (a) The
courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bankruptcy are
created courts of bankruptcy and are invested, within their respective ter-
ritorial limits as now established or as they may be hereafter changed, with
such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original
jurisdiction in proceedings under this title, in vacation, in chambers, and
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diction of the bankruptcy court is explicitly made exclusive by the
Judicial Code,5 but remains, nevertheless, a limited jurisdiction, out-
side of which a state tribunal properly may hear actions related to a
bankruptcy proceeding.52
during their respective terms, as they are now or may be hereafter held, to-
(1) Adjudge persons bankrupt . . . (2) Allow claims, disallow claims,
* . . (3) Appoint . . . receivers or the marshals . . . authorize such
receiver, . . .to prosecute or defend any pending suit. . . or to commence
and prosecute any suit or proceeding . . . before any judicial, legislative,
or administrative tribunal in any jurisdiction . . . (4) Arraign, try, and
punish persons for violations . . . (5) Authorize the business of bankrupts
to be conducted . . . (6) Bring in and substitute additional persons or
parties . . . (7) Cause the estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced
to money, and distributed, and determine controversies in relation thereto,
except as herein otherwise provided, . . . (8) Close estates . . .(9) Con-
firm or reject arrangements or plans proposed under this title, . . . (10)
Consider records, findings, and orders certified to the judges by referees,
and confirm, modify, or reverse such findings and orders, or return such
records with instructions for further proceedings; (11) Determine all claims
of bankrupts to their exemptions; (12) Discharge or refuse to discharge
bankrupts . . . (13) Enforce obedience by persons to all lawful orders,
* . . (14) Extradite bankrupts . . . (15) Make such orders, issue such
process, and enter such judgments, in addition to those specifically provided
for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this title:
Provided, however, That an injunction to restrain a court may be issued by
the judge only; . . . (17) Approve the appointment of trustees by creditors
or appoint trustees when creditors fail so to do; and, upon complaint of
creditors or upon their own motion, remove for cause receivers or trustees
upon hearing after notice; (18) Tax costs, and render judgments . . .
(19) Transfer cases to other courts of bankruptcy; (20) Exercise ancillary
jurisdiction over persons or property within their respective territorial limits
in aid of a receiver or trustee appointed in any bankruptcy proceedings pend-
ing in any other court of bankruptcy: Provided, however, That the juris-
diction of the ancillary court over a bankrupt's property which it takes into its
custody shall not extend beyond preserving such property ....
11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1964).
For the purpose of any recovery or avoidance under this section, where
plenary proceedings are necessary, any State court which would have had
jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened and any court of bankruptcy
shall have concurrent jurisdiction.
11 U.S.C. 96(b) (1964.).
For the purpose of any recovery or avoidance under this section, where
plenary proceedings are necessary, any State court which would have had
jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened and any court of bankruptcy
shall have concurrent jurisdiction.
11 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1964).
(3) For the purpose of such recovery or of the avoidance of such transfer
or obligation, where plenary proceedings are necessary, any State court
which would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened and any
court of bankruptcy shall have concurrent jurisdiction.
11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (3) (1964).
5128 U.S.C. § 1334 (1964). This exclusivity is the case, as well, with the special
bankruptcy courts and reorganization courts, discussed at note 60 infra and accom-
panying text See Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 164 (1946) (" the exclusive
jurisdiction granted the reorganization court by § 77(a) is that which bankruptcy
courts have customarily possessed").
52In Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132 (1949), a railroad undergoing reorganiza-
tion under § 77, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1964), had leased and operated for many years a
smaller and still solvent railroad as a part of its line. The reorganization trustee gave
the leased railroad a choice of a complete sale to the reorganizing railroad or ac-
cepting a recission of the lease and a return of property. Shareholders of the solvent
railroad approved a sale of assets but with a large minority dissent. The minority
shareholders sued under a Georgia state law requiring all shareholders to approve a
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The jurisdictional grant reflects the distinct purpose of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction-to achieve insofar as is possible a fair distribution
of assets to creditors and to provide appropriate relief for the debtor.53
In order to prevent the many possible ways in which individual state
suits could be used to give certain creditors an advantage in satis-
faction of their claims, or to disadvantage debtors, there is a need to
have a single judicial or administrative body in charge of all of the
debtor's assets and all of the proceedings against him. It is, of course,
true that substantially all the claims against a debtor will ordinarily
have arisen under state law."
Bankruptcy administration and jurisdiction thus may be con-
ceived as a federal administrative superstructure imposed on a body
of pre-existing state law relationships which are adjusted, but not
determined, by the federal statute. 6 This federal superstructure essen-
tially serves a clearinghouse function, assembling claims and assets,
either for an equitable distribution or a viable reorganization. Such a
scheme can operate only if the court has control of all assets and
authority to administer all claims. Consequently, federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction premises no minimum jurisdictional amount in contro-
versy. In such a system there well may arise claims which, without
prejudice to the debtor or other creditors, could be more economically,
expeditiously or authoritatively settled in a state court proceeding. The
grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy or reorganization
court does not prohibit allowing state court action. In fact, the Bank-
ruptcy Act itself contemplates state court resolution of certain disputes."6
An evaluation of how the district court should decide to yield its
jurisdiction depends upon an examination of the jurisdictional pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Act.
Ascertaining the line which delimits the jurisdiction of a Bank-
ruptcy Act court 57 is complicated by the fact that a number of major
sale of assets and got a state court injunction against the sale. The trustee got a
district court injunction against continuation of the state court proceedings, which the
court of appeals reversed. 165 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1948). The state court's jurisdic-
tion was upheld since the Bankruptcy Act does not bear on the percentage of share-
holders of a corporation (not before the reorganization court) who must approve a
transaction. Determination of this question was a matter exclusively determinable
in state court, despite its effect on the estate. Accord, Engebretson v. West, 111 F.2d
528 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 663 (1940).
5
3 See notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
5 5 See notes 48 s.upra, 72 infra. This is also the thrust of the jurisdictional sec-
tions discussed at notes 65-75 infra and accompanying text. See ge terally, Hill, The
Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. Rxv. 1013, 1020, 1031-36 (1963).
56 See notes 71-74 infra and accompanying text.
57The term "Bankruptcy Act court" will be used hereafter to refer to any
court established under the Bankruptcy Act, whether sitting in bankruptcy or re-
organization. The term "bankruptcy court" refers to a federal district court sitting
only as a court of bankruptcy.
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provisions have been added to the Bankruptcy Act since its enactment. 58
Chapter X, the most detailed and important of these sections, outlines a
procedure for the reorganization rather than the liquidation of an
insolvent corporate debtor. 9 The chapter also includes a special
grant of jurisdiction to the court administering the reorganization
proceedings.60
There are two elements of federal jurisdiction based on the
Bankruptcy Act that may directly affect the decision of a bankruptcy
58 The greatest number of changes were made by the Chandler Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 840-940 (1938), which made alterations throughout the text and added to the
Bankruptcy Act chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-1086 (1964),
which provide respectively for corporate reorganizations, corporate arrangements,
non-corporate real property arrangements, and wage-earners' plans. Each of these
chapters also includes a section defining the jurisdiction of the court when proceeding
under that chapter. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 511-21, 711-16, 811-16, 1011-16 (1964).
59 Compare Bankruptcy Act § 47, 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1964), with Bankruptcy Act
Chapter X, §§ 169-79, 11 U.S.C. 569-79 (1964). See also Comment, Chapter X
Trustee Adoption of Executory Contracts: The Bankruptcy Act Speaks Through its
Silence, 115 U. PA. L. RBv. 937, 943 nA0 (1967).
60 Sec. 111. Where not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the
court in which a petition is filed shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have
exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property, wherever located.
Sec. 112. Prior to the approval of a petition, the jurisdiction, powers, and
duties of the court and of its officers, where not inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this chapter, shall be the same as in a bankruptcy proceeding before
adjudication.
Sec. 113. Prior to the approval of a petition, the judge may upon cause
shown grant a temporary stay, until the petition is approved or dismissed, of
a prior pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure or equity receivership,
proceeding and of any act or other proceeding to enforce a lien against a
debtor's property, and may upon cause shown enjoin or stay until the petition
is approved or dismissed the commencement or continuation of a suit against
a debtor.
Sec. 114. Upon the approval of a petition, the jurisdiction, powers, and duties
of the court and of its officers, where not inconsistent with the provisions
of this chapter, shall be the same as in a bankrupcty proceeding upon ad-
judication.
Sec. 115. Upon the approval of a petition, the court shall have and may, in
addition to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties hereinabove and elsewhere in
this chapter conferred and imposed upon it, exercise all the powers, not in-
consistent with the provisions of this chapter, which a court of the United
States would have if it had appointed a receiver in equity of the property
of the debtor on the ground of insolvency or inability to meet its debts as
they mature.
See. 116. Upon the approval of a petition, the judge may, in addition to the
jurisdiction, powers, and duties hereinabove and elsewhere in this chapter
conferred and imposed upon him and the court-
(1) permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor,....
(2) authorize a receiver, trustee, or debtor in possession, ... to issue
certificates of indebtedness ....
(3) authorize . . . to lease or sell any property of the debtor,.
(4) in addition to the relief provided by section 11 of this Act, enjoin or
stay until final decree the commencement or continuation of a suit against
the debtor or its trustee or any act or proceeding to enforce a lien upon
the property of the debtor.
Se'. "117. The judge may, at any state of a proceeding under this chapter,
refer the proceeding to a referee in bankruptcy to hear and determine any
and all matters not reserved to the judge by the provisions of this chapter,
or to a referee as special master to hear and report generally or upon
specified matters.
11 U.S.C. § 511-21 (1964).
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or reorganization court to abstain. The first is the establishment in
bankruptcy litigation of two distinct forms of procedure--summary and
plenary proceedings."' A summary proceeding is generally char-
acterized by the informality of its procedure in comparison with its
plenary counterpart. In a summary proceeding there is only a petition,
not a formal pleading; parties are brought in by an order to show cause,
rather than by regular service of process; the time of notice is fixed
at the discretion of the court, instead of by statute or court rule; and
hearing may be on affidavit, rather than by examination of witnesses
in open court.6
A plenary proceeding, on the other hand, will involve procedure
not substantially different from the usual court proceeding, since ordi-
narily the regular requirements of the court before which it is brought
will be followed. Plenary procedure thus involves the issuance of a
summons or process, formal pleading, depositions of witnesses and,
not infrequently, a jury trial."6
The establishment of summary proceedings in bankruptcy was
one of the ways in which Congress hoped to effectuate the goals of
a rapid and economical distribution of assets.64 Thus, it is generally
contemplated that proceedings in a straight bankruptcy court will be
of a summary fashion. 5 The Bankruptcy Act details three specific
exceptions to this principle, and in each instance the jurisdiction of the
straight bankruptcy court is also concurrent with the appropriate state
courts. Proceedings are plenary, rather than summary, when the
controversy is an action by a trustee or receiver under section 60 to
recover or avoid a preference to a creditor by a debtor, 6 an action
under section 67 to secure a recovery of fraudulent transfers, 67 or an
action which involves questions of title under section 70.68
It similarly is contemplated that a reorganization court will
proceed in a largely summary fashion." Under chapter X, however,
there is a substantially larger grant of plenary jurisdiction to the
61See Mussman & Riesenfeld, Jurisdiction in. Bankruptcy, 13 LAW & CONTEmp.
PROB. 88, 97 (1948), for a general discussion of this jurisdictional dichotomy.
62 Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721, 731-32 (8th
Cir. 1932).
6 Only in certain special cases, however, is a jury available within the bankruptcy
proceedings, and then by special provision in the Bankruptcy Act. For a person
against whom an involuntary petition in bankruptcy has been filed, there is a right to
a jury determination of the question of insolvency and of the commission of an act of
bankruptcy. See § 19, 11 U.S.C. § 42 (1964).
6 See notes 85-88 infra and accompanying text.
65 See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329 (1966).
66 11 U.S.C. § 96b (1964). The full text of this section and those referred to in
the following two notes is reproduced at note 50 supra.
67 11 U.S.C. § 107e (1964).
68 11 U.S.C. § 110e(3) (1964).
69 The purpose of the chapter X reorganization procedure-like that of its pred-
ecessor, section 77B-was to secure for equity receiverships the benefits and remedies
of straight bankruptcy, including the less costly and more expeditious summary pro-
ceedings. See Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 218-20 (1935) ;
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reorganization court."° Section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act contemplates
that "all controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from
proceedings under this Act, between receivers and trustees as such and
adverse claimants, concerning the property acquired or claimed by the
receivers or trustees," 7' will be prosecuted in the forum "where the
bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings under
this Act had not been instituted" as opposed to a determination
within the bankruptcy court itself.72 Section 102, however, specifically
suspends the operation of section 23 in chapter X reorganization.73 The
reorganization court thus may find itself in the position of hearing many
controversies that for its bankruptcy counterpart would be determined
in an alternate forum.'
The second distinctive element of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
which merits particular consideration by a Bankruptcy Act court con-
sidering abstention is an outgrowth of the powers of a bankruptcy or re-
organization court to stay proceedings in other fora. Not infrequently,
claims, foreclosure proceedings and other legal actions are pending
against a debtor at the time a petition in bankruptcy or reorganization
is filed. Such suits frequently are being prosecuted in state court, which
makes relevant section 2283 of the 1948 Judicial Code:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 5
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 294 U.S. 648,
671-73 (1935); Comment, Chapter X Trustee Adoption of Executory Contracts:
The Bankruptcy Act Speaks Through its Silence, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 937, 941-44
(1967).
70 Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947).
71 11 U.S.C. § 46a (1964) (emphasis added).
72 11 U.S.C. § 46b (1964). This was largely meant to allow proceedings in state
courts. Reporting on the bill, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
explained:
The jurisdiction of State courts to try controversies between the trustees
of bankrupt estates and parties claiming adverse interest is not in any way
interfered with. Under the last bankruptcy law the litigation incident to the
settlement of estates was conducted almost wholly in United States courts.
The result was great inconvenience and much expense to a majority of the
people interested in such litigation as principals, witnesses, and attorneys.
Such will not be the effect under this bill. It is proper that such should be
the case, speaking generally in behalf of the administration of justice.
31 CONG. REc. 1785 (1898).
73 Sec. 102. The provisions of chapters I to VII, inclusive, of this Act shall,
insofar as they are not inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this
chapter, apply in proceedings under this Chapter [X]: Provided, however,
That section 23, . . . shall not apply in such proceedings ....
11 U.S.C. § 502 (1964).
74 There is interestingly no corresponding expansion of jurisdiction for chapter
XI arrangements, see § 302, 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1964); chapter XII real property
arrangements, see § 402, 11 U.S.C. § 802 (1964) ; or Chapter XIII wage earner plans,
see § 602, 11 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964).
75 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) (emphasis added).
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The Bankruptcy Act contains several such authorizations. 6 The
issuance of an injunction, effective until dismissal of the petition or
adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt, is mandatory upon the court
when a bankruptcy petition is filed, but, upon adjudication, becomes
discretionary."'
Similarly, the reorganization court inherits this power by virtue
of section 102,"8 where not inconsistent with the similar specific grant
within chapter X itself.79 This injunctive power is discretionary until
a petition is approved, at which time that approval itself becomes a stay
of prior bankruptcy or equity receivership proceedings to foreclose a
mortgage or to enforce any other lien against the debtor's property."0
Moreover, both the bankruptcy and reorganization courts inherit
the power of other federal courts to issue injunctions where necessary
in protection of their jurisdiction.8' This power is particularly
important in the bankruptcy context as a means of conserving the
estate of the debtor or bankrupt against suits to enforce liens or fore-
close mortgages against property of the debtor.' The power, of
course, is not without limit, and neither court may enjoin litigation
beyond its jurisdiction, even though the outcome of the controversy
may be of concern to the proceedings.8 3
Finally, in addition to the unique nature of bankruptcy juris-
diction, a federal district court sitting as a court of bankruptcy or
reorganization must consider the essentially distinct objectives of the
proceedings before it. It is established beyond question that the two-
fold purpose of a bankruptcy proceeding is to control the distribution
I6 These present exceptions in the Bankruptcy Act were actually enacted before
the present Judicial Code, in accordance with a long-standing exception in older codes
which allowed injunction of state proceedings by federal bankruptcy courts. See
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 47 (1963).
77 This provision, §2a(15), 11 U.S.C. § lla(15) (1964), is reproduced at note 50
upra. Section 11a provides, moreover, that:
A suit which is founded upon a claim from which a discharge would be
a release, and which is pending against a person at the time of filing of a
petition by or against him, shall be stayed until an adjudication or the dis-
missal of the petition; if such person is adjudged a bankrupt, such action may
be further stayed until the question of his discharge is determined by the
court .
11 U.S.C. § 29a (1964) (emphasis added).
7 8 See note 73 supra.
79See Bankruptcy Act §§113, 116(4), 11 U.S.C. §§513, 516(4) (1964), re-
produced at note 60 supmra.
80 Sec. 148. Until otherwise ordered by the judge, an order approving a
petiton shall operate as a stay of a prior pending bankruptcy, mortgage fore-
closure, or equity receivership proceeding, and of any act or other proceed-
ing to enforce a lien against the debtor's property.
11 U.S.C. § 548 (1964).
8 1 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
82 See discussion at notes 122-24 infra and accompanying text.
8 3 Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132 (1948), discussed at note 52 supra and
accompanying text.
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of the assets of an insolvent debtor to insure an equitable distribution
among creditors and to provide relief and a fresh start for an honest
debtor.' To achieve this objective it always has been a statutory and
judicial imperative that the proceedings progress in a rapid fashion 85
and as economically as possible.8 6 Similarly, although reorganization
proceedings envisage a rehabilitation rather than liquidation of the
debtor,"7 alacrity and economy in accomplishing this are, as in straight
bankruptcy, essentials of sound administration by the court." It is
apparent from the statutory provisions " that, although the primary
purpose of chapter X is one of reorganization, and although chapter X
proceedings can be brought only against a corporation having some
hope of reorganization to begin with, if it later develops that this
hope was unfounded and that the only way to "reorganize" the debtor
is in effect to liquidate its assets, the liquidation may be done with
the framework of a "plan of reorganization." 0 Thus, a proceeding
84 This has been the consistent concern of the Supreme Court under the current
Bankruptcy Act, Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962) ; Straton v. New, 283
U.S. 318 (1931); Williams v. United States, Fidelity Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915), and
even before under earlier acts. Wiswall v. Campbell, 93 U.S. 347 (1867).
85 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1966) ; see 1 H. REmxnGToN, BANE-
Ruptcy § 27 (1950). Thus the court should not attempt any greater adjudication of
rights than necessary for proper administration of the estate. See Goldenberg v.
Westover, 150 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1946); In re Railroad Supply Co., 78 F.2d 530 (7th
Cir. 1935).
8 6 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966) and congressional materials cited;
see 1 H. REmiNGToN, BANKRUPTCy § 28 (1950).
87 This is the contemplation of the Bankruptcy Act §§ 169-79, 11 U.S.C. §§ 569-
80 (1964), covering the development and approval of a plan of reorganization. See
note 59 supra.
88 See Hearings on H.R. 8046 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937) (statement of Congressman Chandler) (emphasis added):
While corporate reorganization, as now proposed under the bill, to a
great extent, rewrites the present act thereon (Q 77B), nevertheless all -alu-
able features have been retained, together with many changes proven neces-
sary by experience. There will be noted . . . the attempt, as far as possible,
to remove the abuses of the present act, to speed up procedure, and to
economize.
This was the initial impetus for § 77B as well, see note 69 .rupra.
89 Section 216(10) provides:
A plan of reorganization under this Chapter [X]
(10) shall provide adequate means for the execution of the plan, which
may include: the retention by the debtor of all or any part of its property; the
sale or transfer of all or any part of its property to one or more other cor-
porations theretofore organized or thereafter to be organized; the merger
or consolidation of the debtor with one or more other corporations; the sale
of all or any part of its property, either subject to or free from any lien, at
not less than a fair upset price and the distribution of all or any assets, or the
proceeds derived from the sale thereof, among those having an interest
therein ....
11 U.S.C. § 616 (1964) (emphasis added). See generally 6A W. CoLmiER, BANK-
RUTCmY 10.02, at 421-23 (1965).
9 00See Central States Elec. Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1950); In re Puerto Rican American Tobacco Co., 112 F2d
655 (2d Cir. 1940). In any event, the trustee must submit a plan of reorganization
within the deadline set by the court to avoid the possibility of dismissal or transfer
19681
958 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
which is essentially a liquidation may be based on the jurisdictional
provisions of a reorganization under chapter X.
BANKRUPTCY ABSTENTION: A BETTER APPROACH
Absent some indication to the contrary, it could be assumed that
application of the abstention doctrine was incumbent upon bank-
ruptcy and reorganization courts as lower federal courts. Indeed,
the Supreme Court had mandated application of the doctrine in the
proceedings of federal district courts, sitting as courts of bankruptcy
or reorganization, even before the doctrine was articulated in Pullman.9
Six years before Pullman, the Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v.
Williams,9' ordered district court deference to state proceedings without
denominating such action abstention. This result was reached despite
a properly filed petition for federal appointment of a receiver to secure
the assets of an insolvent building and loan association,' in view of a
comprehensive state statutory scheme for liquidation of such institu-
tions.94 The reasoning of the Court 9 5 tracks that which it used in
allowing comity abstention where the probability of interfering with a
state's domestic policy and administration through over-zealous use of
federal injunctive power was sufficient to outweigh the concerns pro-
tected by federal diversity jurisdiction. 6
While it is clear that federal district courts sitting in bankruptcy
or reorganization have had frequent recourse to the abstention device,
even in situations which clearly do not present facts justifying consti-
into straight bankruptcy, which becomes possible when the plan of reorganization
is not forthcoming or is not accepted. Bankruptcy Act § 236, 11 U.S.C. § 636 (1964).
Conversely, the conversion of bankruptcy proceedings to reorganization is not only
contemplated, but is provided for in the Bankruptcy Act by § 127, 11 U.S.C. § 527
(1964) : "A petition [under chapter X] may be filed in a pending bankruptcy pro-
ceeding either before or after the adjudication of a corporation."
91 E.g., Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940), discussed
at notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text; Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines, 299 U.S.
77 (1936), discussed at notes 102-11 infra and accompanying text.
92294 U.S. 176 (1935).
93 The district court had appointed the receiver over the objections of the Penn-
sylvania Secretary of Banking, the debtor having joined the petition in the request
for a receiver. Elson v. Mortgage Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 4 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Pa.
1933), aff'd sub nor., Pennsylvania v. Williams, 72 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1934).
94Accord, Gordon v. Omrisky, 294 U.S. 186 (1935) (building and loan associ-
ation liquidation); Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189 (1935)
(insurance company liquidation).
95 294 U.S. at 185.
96See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text. For a recent illustration of
abstention in deference to state administration, see California Oil Co. v. Huffstutter,
322 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1963) (semble). Although the opinion evidences some con-
fusion (the court abstractly discussed and dismissed abstention as an alternative, but
instead relied on such oft-cited abstention cases as Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943), which it found to stand for a "non-authority" of the court to act in a
situation presenting abstention facts), the court refused to interfere with the plan of
a state regulatory agency for a revision of certain drilling and production units,
including those of the debtor. The trustee opposed this revision, although the com-
pany had been voluntarily participating in the proceedings before the petition in
reorganization was filed. On these facts, the court refused to interfere with this
state activity.
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tutional or comity abstention, 7 an analysis of bankruptcy abstention is
made more difficult due to the failure of most decisions to deal with or
perceive as relevant the fact that their jurisdiction rests on bankruptcy
rather than diversity or a federal question. Much of the discussion is
highly doctrinal and phrased in terms of the Pullman-articulated
concerns.
98
In the absence of any of the concerns that prompted development
of the classical doctrine, abstention in the bankruptcy context must be
justified-and indeed achieved-as a function of the special concerns,
procedures and jurisdiction of bankruptcy administration already
detailed."'
Authority for this exercise of the bankruptcy court's equitable
discretion may be found in the case of Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines.'
07 Submeyer v. Pfohlman, 329 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1964); First Nat'l Bank v.
Reed, 306 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1962) ; In re Terrace Lawn Memorial Gardens, 256 F.2d
398 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Gramil Weaving Corp. v. Raindeer Fabrics, 185 F.2d 537 (2d
Cir. 1950); In re Central R.R., 163 F.2d 44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 810
(1947) ; Finn v. 415 Fifth Ave. Co., 153 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
838 (1946) ; Redmond v. United Funds Management, 144 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 776 (1944) ; In re Fine Arts Corp., 136 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1943) ;
Mack v. Pacific S.S. Lines Ltd., 94 F.2d 95 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 582
(1937) ; It re Adolf Gobel Inc., 89 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1937).
Similarly, the commentators have drawn this conclusion, largely on the authority
of Thompson. See 1 H. REImINGTox, BAKRupuocY § 79; 1 W. CoLLIER, BANICRUPTCY
112.07; 6 id. ff 3.08. Moreover, there is reason to suspect that the use of this approach
may be considerably more common than the number of appeals would indicate. Ordi-
narily, the only effect of abstention will be that the proceeding is conducted in a
different forum and may possibly involve some procedural variance. The burden
in time and expense of an appeal to the circuit court, even if successful, may often
be greater than the hardship which compliance with the decision would entail, and
parties, therefore, may be reluctant to appeal decisions which they view as incorrect.
98 Thompson, despite the Meredith problem, see notes 21-30 supra, is frequently
relied upon where the abstention is on bankruptcy grounds and no federal problem
is presented. See, e.g., Gramil Weaving Corp. v. Raindeer Fabrics, Inc., 185 F.2
537, 540 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Redmond v. United Funds Management, 144 F.2d 155, 158
n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 776 (1944). Other readings of the cases have
included: Finn v. 415 Fifth Ave. Co., 153 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 838 (1946) (Thompson, Foust and Texas cited for the identical proposition,
but only Foust and Texas correctly cited) ; Layton v. Thayne, 144 F.2d 94, 96 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 786 (1944) (relying solely on an out-of-context quotation
from Meredith) ; In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 109 F.2d 136, 137 (2d Cir. 1940)
(no authority cited, but Foust, an applicable bankruptcy abstention authority, dis-
tinguished in the dissent). There may be some analogy between these cases and
those which some authorities regard as indicating a fourth classical ground for ab-
stention-to serve the convenience of the federal courts. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, FED-
RaIu. CouxTs § 52, at 176-77 (1963) and cases cited. Outside of bankruptcy there
never has been a Supreme Court sanction of this approach and the Court's reaffirma-
tions of Meredith, see note 34 supra and accompanying text, suggest there may not
be. The cases cited by Wright present more of a collection of largely unrelated
abstention decisions on peculiar facts than a clear, fourth area.
99 These include: the need for speed and economy of administration, see notes
85-88 supra and accompanying text; the distinctive summary-plenary procedural
dichotomy, see notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text; the expansive authority to
stay state proceedings, see notes 75-83 supra and accompanying text; the related but not
identical objective of bankruptcy proceedings compared with reorganization proceed-
ings, see notes 58, 87 supra and accompanying text; and the particular view the Bank-
ruptcy Act takes of state law proceedings, see notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
100 299 U.S. 77 (1936); accord, Mack v. Pacific S.S. Lines Ltd., 94 F2d 95
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 582 (1938); In re Adolf Gobel, Inc., 89 F.2d
171 (2d Cir. 1937).
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In Foust the master appointed by the bankruptcy court was ordered
by the Supreme Court to abstain from proceeding further and to permit
the prosecution of the action in another federal court. Clearly, this
case did not present any classical ground for abstention since no state
court proceeding received deference. Most important, the case con-
tained the seeds of an analysis applicable to a bankruptcy court's de-
cision to permit proceedings in state as well as in other federal courts.
The plaintiff in Foust, the administrator of the estate of a former
employee of the defendant steamship company, was pursuing a claim
for the employee's death against the steamship company under section
33 of the Merchant Marine Act.'' Pursuant to the filing of a petition
for reorganization, 102 a stay of all suits, including the plaintiff's against
the company, was entered..0 3  The plaintiff petitioned for removal of
the stay in order to continue to press the claim in district court where
it would be determined by a jury, instead of by the master in bank-
ruptcy. The district court denied leave 104 and the circuit court of
appeals affirmed. 05
Because the plaintiff had shown that insurance carried by the
company would probably cover the claim and thus not diminish the
debtor's estate, against which the trustee had argued only the possibility
that the district court jury might return a larger verdict than the
master in bankruptcy, the Supreme Court unanimously' 06 reversed the
continuation of the stay as an abuse of discretion10 7 The Court found
that "[t]he Circuit Court of Appeals rightly held petitioner's claim
provable and dischargeable [in the reorganization proceeding] and the
district judge empowered to stay proceedings in the suit." 10 But the
Court indicated that the district court should abstain in any event:
There is nothing in the record to warrant a finding that
liquidation of petitioner's claim by trial of his pending action
at law would hinder, burden, delay or be at all inconsistent
with the pending corporate reorganization proceeding ....
Injunction against that method of establishing the debtor's
liability, if any there is, ought not to stand. 0 9
140146 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
102 Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, as added by the Act of June 7, 1934,
ch. 424, § 1, 48 Stat. 912, under which the petition was filed, was the original general
reorganization provision; it was amended in 1938 and incorporated as chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1964).
103 299 U.S. at 79.
104 11. re Munson S.S. Line, 80 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1936).
105 Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines, 82 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1936) (per curiam).
106 Justice Stone did not take part in the decision.
107As in other matters within the bankruptcy court's discretion, the standard
on review is reversal only for abuse of discretion. The reversal in Foust was on
this ground. See also Marian Corp. v. Bray, 235 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1956) (per
curiam).
108 299 U.S. at 81.
109 299 U.S. at 87-88 (emphasis added).
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Bankruptcy abstention is thus conceived of by the Foust Court as
properly within the equitable discretion ordinarily exercised by a
district court without reference to the classical grounds for abstention.110
While such discretion has been exercised in subsequent bankruptcy and
reorganization cases which presented facts not justifying classical
abstention, the cases have not always struck the careful balance re-
quired by equitable bankruptcy administration.""
In deciding that it is preferable to permit the resolution of a
particular controversy by another tribunal, the district court faces a
complex matrix of variables. Because any discretionary decision should
be grounded in the facts before the court, there can be no quick answer
to the question when abstention is appropriate. Nevertheless, the
relevant considerations and a sound approach to the problem may be
indicated. At the threshold, of course, the court must determine
whether it has jurisdiction over the controversy." 2 Given jurisdiction,
the court then should consider the available alternatives: it may either
decide to exercise its jurisdiction, resolving the controversy in sum-
mary or plenary fashion (whichever is appropriate '11), or it may
abstain, either permitting an alternative proceeding to continue 114 or
directing the trustee to take steps such as the prosecution or defense
of the action in another proceeding." 5  In this procedural context, two
factors will be of significant importance to the bankruptcy or reorgani-
zation court's decision to abstain, since the court's choice at this
110 The variety of situations in which bankruptcy abstention has been employed
is illustrated by these cases: Submeyer v. Pfohlman, 329 F2d 915 (9th Cir. 1964)
(wife's community property rights); Ip re Terrace Lawn Memorial Gardens, 256
F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1958) (usurious interest charge, shareholder identification and
recognition of stock transactions) ; Gramil Weaving Corp. v. Raindeer Fabrics, Inc.,
185 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950) (title dispute) ; Finn v. 415 Fifth Ave. Co., 133 F.2d
501 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 838 (1946) (rent determination under state
control statute); Redmond v. United Funds Management, 144 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 776 (1944) (determination of indenture trustee's duties);
Layton v. Thayne, 144 F2d 94 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 786 (1944) (setting
redemption preferences); In re New York N.H. & H.R.R., 109 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.
1940) (secondary liability of leasehold assignee).
"'See cases cited note 98 stipra.
132 Clearly no court reasonably may engage in consideration of whether or not
to exercise a jurisdiction it does not have. Cf. Sulmeyer v. Pfohlman, 329 F.2d 915
(9th Cir. 1964) (state proceeding allowed to continue, overruling referee's stay where
referee failed to properly find on jurisdiction).
113 See notes 61-74 supra and accompanying text. This may itself be a matter
of dispute. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 323-37 (1966).
114 This follows from the bankruptcy and reorganization court's ability to stay
the state court proceedings. See notes 75-83 supra and accompanying text. The
court, however, may refuse to stay (or lift a temporary stay of) the state action and
elect not to proceed in the matter. This is one of the quickest and most effective
means for a federal court to abstain, since it eliminates any delay or uncertainty such
as may follow where the parties to the federal action have yet to file suit in state
court. For a general discussion of this approach, see Note, Stays of Federal Pro-
ceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Snits, 60 CoLum. L. Ray.
684 (1960).
115 This authority is derived from the jurisdictional grant of the Bankruptcy
Act, §§2(3) and (17), reproduced at note 50 supra, and §§11(b), (c) and (e),
11 U.S.C. §§29(b), (c), (e) (1964).
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juncture will usually affect the time and expense of administration of
the proceeding: (1) the possible pendency of a prior proceeding; and
(2) whether proceedings within the bankruptcy or reorganization
process would be plenary or summary.
Where the proceeding would be summary in the bankruptcy or
reorganization court, but plenary in an alternate forum, and where there
is no action pending in which the question or controversy could be
resolved, no basis for bankruptcy abstention is present. Abstaining
will yield a longer and more costly resolution of the question."0 Such
a result conflicts with the congressional goals for bankruptcy proceed-
ings-rapid and economical administration." 7
On the other hand, presented with the same summary-plenary
procedural dichotomy in a controversy in which a prior proceeding had
been stayed, that litigation already may have progressed to such a
point that even summary proceedings in district court would be both
more time-consuming and costly than allowing the plenary suit to
continue to a final determination." 8 Abstention is therefore consistent
with the rationale and concerns of the Bankruptcy Act."9
The situation is different where the conflict must be resolved by
plenary suit regardless of the forum. Where no pending proceeding
has been stayed, considerations of economy and efficiency of adminis-
tration will be essentially the same regardless of whether a plenary suit
is instituted before the bankruptcy or state (or alternative federal)
court. 2
116See Ernst v. Oberferst, 166 F.2d 519, 523 (2d Cir. 1948), discussed at note
134 infra and accompanying text.
17 But cf. In re New York, N.H. & HR.R., 109 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1940). The
opinion, upholding the discretionary abstention of the reorganization court, discusses
the time considerations of a determination in state court, as opposed to one within the
reorganization proceedings, and suggests a proper abstention ground would be pre-
sented where the "reorganization docket may be so crowded that . . . a quicker
decision could be reached in Massachusetts." Id. at 137.
"i
8 See Gramil Weaving Corp. v. Raindeer Fabrics, Inc., 185 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.
1950) ; Layton v. Thayne, 144 F.2d 94 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 786 (1944).
In Gramil the plaintiff asked for an appraisal in the bankruptcy proceeding of its
secured claim (pursuant to which an attachment proceeding was begun in Massa-
chusetts state court) and an unsecured claim for the amount in excess of the attached
property. The debtor argued, in opposition to the attachment, that the claim was
unsecured. In response to a petition by other creditors for stay of the Massachusetts
action, the court, possibly considering the time and delay of settling the questions
within the bankruptcy proceeding, ordered abstention applying the following test:
Although the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction, it may, in the exercise of a
proper discretion, decline to exercise it if the best interests of the estate and
of all interested parties would be better served by permitting an issue to be
litigated in a state court.
185 F.2d at 540 (emphasis added).
119 This statement assumes for simplicity of analysis that there would be no
variations in docket to obviate the difference. In actuality this may not be the case,
and the court should weigh this factor as well when reaching its decision. See In re
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 109 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1940).
'
20 See Texas v. Donoghue, 302 U.S. 284 (1937), where the state claimed prior
title, under a forfeiture statute, to oil illegally produced by the debtor in contravention
of a valid state regulatory scheme. Texas sought permission for a state court title
suit which the Court ordered, although the opinion of Mr. Justice Butler offers
[Vo1.116:942
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However, where a prior state proceeding has been enjoined, a
plenary determination of the issue within the bankruptcy or reorganiza-
tion proceedings would not seem warranted if the prior proceeding had
already made substantial progress toward a resolution; insistence upon
the duplication of an entire or substantial part of the litigation in a
plenary bankruptcy or reorganization proceeding would seem to be in
disregard of the congressional concern for the shortest possible ad-
ministration of the debtor's estate.' 2 '
In addition to these procedural factors, the bankruptcy or reorgani-
zation court considering abstention should also focus on the nature
of the controversy presenting the question. Whether the proceeding
is one in bankruptcy, contemplating an equitable liquidation of the
debtor's assets, or one in reorganization, contemplating a reorganization
of the corporate capital structure, the importance to the court of being
able to protect a debtor's property is self-evident." s  It follows that a
court should consider actions or claims which pose a threat of diminish-
ing the debtor's estate differently than unsecured or in personam claims
when abstention is proposed. Thus, abstention is generally inappro-
priate in a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage or to enforce a lien
against the debtor's property.'23  Conversely, where a controversy
poses no threat to the estate which the court is administering, abstention
to allow resolution of the question in another forum often will expedite
the administration of the entire estate.' 24  One subset of in personam
almost no insight into the grounds upon which abstention was ordered. It appears
however that the equipoise of procedural posture may have been considered by the
Court. The dissent by Mr. Justice Cardozo argues that the reorganization court
should have made the title determination in order to save time and expense, but he
bases that argument on the ground that the reorganization court would not be
required to recognize the Texas result, a conclusion specifically negatived in the
majority opinion.
121 In re Terrace Lawn Memorial Gardens, 256 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1958). Ab-
stention was ordered with the following discussion of the grounds:
Prior pendency of state litigation is a strong factor in the exercise of
the discretion of the federal judge. These actions had been pending for a
number of months and were on the eve of trial when the petition for reorgani-
zation was filed.
Id. at 402.
1= This need to protect the property in the custody of the court may be the
reason for the long-standing exception in the Judicial Code allowing bankruptcy
courts the generally prohibited power to enjoin state court proceedings. See note
76 supra. This certainly appears to be the contemplation of § 148, reproduced at
note 80 upra, which makes such stays in reorganization automatic against actions
to enforce liens or foreclose mortgages, which are the most threatening to a debtor's
estate.
123 See In re Fine Arts Corp., 136 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1943) (allowance of a sale
by the city of property which constituted almost all of the debtor's assets, with a
state court determination of the right of the trustee to bid at such a sale, would frustrate
reorganization). There is one important exception to this general approach. Where
the proceeding is one in bankruptcy and the threatened property is over-encumbered,
assumption of the proceeding by the court may be improper. See notes 127-29 infra
and accompanying text.
12 4 In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 109 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1940) ; see Redmond
v. United Funds Management Corp., 144 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
776 (1944). In In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., an in personam action against a
1968]
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claims seems to merit special comment in this regard. It is the clear
holding of Foust that in circumstances where the pending proceeding
does not threaten to diminish the estate and would, in addition, secure
the advantage of a jury trial desired by the plaintiff, abstention is
appropriate!
25
In addition to considerations of procedure and the nature of the
controversy, the court should remain cognizant whether the proceedings
which it is administering are in straight bankruptcy or reorganization.
While it is clear that both proceedings are to be conducted economically
and efficiently, they progress toward somewhat antithetical goals:
liquidation of the bankrupt's estate or rehabilitation of the reorganizing
debtor.'2 6
In this respect, the rather well-settled principle of bankruptcy ad-
ministration, that a trustee should abandon an asset which is less
valuable than its encumbrances, ' 7 in the abstention context would
suggest allowing foreclosure of such property rather than staying such
an action.12 8  A reorganization court may hardly be so cavalier, and
must look closely at each asset before disposing of it, in view of the
possibility that it may be needed to properly reorganize and continue
the debtor's business. 2 9 Abstaining in such a reorganization context
is not desirable; retention of jurisdiction may be inferred as the con-
gressional intention.130 Similarly, where the reorganization court's
jurisdiction is grounded on section 102 of chapter X, which excepts the
reorganization court from the bankruptcy court's section 23 juris-
dictional limit,'"' the decision to abstain will of course be made with
bank, alleging a secondary liability for breach of covenants in a lease which it had
accepted as security, was allowed in view of the fact it would not affect the debtor's
estate. Similarly, in Redmond, the indenture trustee for bonds of the debtor was
allowed to prosecute a state action to determine its state law duties in that capacity.
'25See notes 100-09 supra and accompanying text.
'26 See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
'27See 1 MODERN BANKRUPTcY MANUAL §§ 938-40 (1966); Note, Abandonment
of Assets by a Trustee in Bankruptcy, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 415 (1953). This rule
is based in the concern for economy of administration. Since the excess of encum-
brances over the asset's value will usually be claimed against the bankrupt's estate
in any event, assumption of the liquidation of a secured asset usually only will raise
the total amount of priority claims and the total value of the estate's assets by an
equal amount-producing no advantage, but necessitating additional administration
with delay and increase in cost probably resulting.
' 2 See Gramil Weaving Corp. v. Raindeer Fabrics, Inc., 185 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.
1950) (attached asset's value less than secured claim) ; Layton v. Thayne, 144 F.2d
94 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 786 (1944) (liquidation preferences following
foreclosure disputed between first and second mortgages). This result follows, since
the property would not increase the amount available to be distributed to creditors
by as much as the encumbrances would increase the claims against the distributable
funds.
'29See In re Fine Arts Corp., 136 F,2d 28 (6th Cir. 1943), discussed at note
123 supra.
1 0 See notes 59, 84, 87 supra.
'1 This expansion of jurisdiction is detailed at notes 71-74 supra and accom-
panying text. See also Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947).
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reference to the need for judicial control of assets required for successful
business rehabilitation."' On the other hand, where a chapter X plan
contemplates liquidation," the court should view the choice of forum
or procedure as a court sitting in straight bankruptcy.
Other subtle differences between reorganization and bankruptcy
on the facts of a given case may be sufficiently important to affect a
court's decision to abstain. Thus, in Ernst v. Oberferst,"' for example,
the court found that a claim for rent due under the state statute
should be determined in the bankruptcy proceeding in view of the
time and expense a state proceeding would involve. However, the
court suggested that resort to a state determination might be both
convenient and desirable were it faced with this question in a re-
organization proceeding where the amount fixed would bind the re-
organized corporation, and continue to be paid over a substantial period
of time.13 5
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the cases which extrapolate the discretionary
Foust approach offer an analysis for deciding when to abstain in bank-
ruptcy or reorganization which is superior to the doctrinal Pullman
approach and the cases properly relying on it. Foust indicates that the
district court should balance, in the exercise of its equitable bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, the numerous factors which are peculiar to bank-
ruptcy and reorganization. Reliance on the authority of Thompson,
so far as it is based on the classical abstention ground of uncertain
state law, lies under the shadow of Meredith's holding that this ground
alone is not a sufficient basis for abstention. And, insofar as Thompson
may be viewed as relying on the special character of bankruptcy, its
authority is tenuous since the Supreme Court did not take the oppor-
tunity to explicitly distinguish it on this ground.
Even more compelling a reason for a federal court sitting in
bankruptcy or reorganization to utilize the discretionary approach is
that it is sufficiently flexible to subsume doctrinal, jurisdictional and
substantive factors into a consistent and unified approach to abstention
in proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. Using Foust, the court
may consider any of the special bankruptcy and reorganization con-
cerns which ought properly to influence abstention, even though no
132 See note 73 srupra. The statute itself contemplates this approach by providing
that section 23, which was enacted to allow, in bankruptcy administration, the prose-
cution of certain plenary claims in state courts, is inapplicable only in chapter X
reorganizations. This carefully limited expansion of jurisdiction evidences congres-
sional recognition of circumstances extant in chapter X reorganizations which may
require more extensively centralized control by the court.
133 See notes 89-90 .ipra and accompanying text.
134 166 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1948).
135 Id. at 523.
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Thompson problem of unclear state law appears. Further, it may well
be that the relevant state law is unconstrued, highly complex or of a
distinctively local nature. Such a condition of state law affects both
the time and expense of the court's deliberations. To a court con-
sidering abstention from the Foust-derived perspective, the problem
of state law may still be viewed as a factor to be considered in the
exercise of discretion (and one which might, when balanced with other
factors, actually be decisive) while under Meredith it would not have
been of sufficient importance to be an independent ground for the
same action.
